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Why email sign-in needs a passkey

An email link proves you can read an inbox. A passkey proves you hold a device that only you can unlock. Hadron asks for both when you sign in by email, so that anyone who gets into your inbox still cannot get into your account.

Who is affected

  • Email sign-in needs a passkey. A person completes that step; an agent never can, and the CLI does not run it either.
  • GitHub, Google and Apple sign-ins do not. Hadron hands authentication to the provider, and adds no factor of its own.
  • Keys and tokens you already hold are unaffected, and minting a new key adds no factor.
  • A magic link alone never removes a passkey. Removing one needs a proof an email link cannot give, or the cancel link Hadron sends when a first passkey is added.

The shape of the flow

The email link no longer signs you in. It opens a page served by the Hadron server itself, and nothing usable (no session, no key, no code) exists until the passkey answers. At the passkey step, a failed, expired or reused attempt gets one fixed answer, so the page does not tell an attacker which condition failed. The portal and the CLI both continue after the passkey with their original sign-in request intact.

A person with no passkey is sent to add one through a second emailed link, bound to the same browser, because the first link must not be enough to enrol the factor that guards it. The first passkey sits in a cooling-off window (a passkey added later, vouched for by one you already hold, has none) so a passkey added by an intruder can be removed before it can sign anything that counts.

What this page does not decide

What support may do for someone who has lost every passkey and has no linked provider account is an open question, as are any exception for demo accounts and whether the steps for adding a first passkey will change. The specification records these as undecided and so does this site. The rules themselves live in cor:aut:030:02 and cor:aut:040:07; they are not restated here.